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Abstract
The United Kingdom government regards its regu-
lations for stem cell research as some of the most
rigorous in the world.  This paper chronologically
outlines the important stages in the evolution of
these regulatory measures over the past twenty
years, including the Warnock Report, the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, the subse-
quent series of reports and consultations, and the
establishment of the UK stem cell bank.  Attending
both to the discursive framing of stem cell research
and the ethical issues faced, an assessment is made
in terms of the appropriateness, adequacy and
effectiveness of the UK’s regulatory measures.
Although institutional learning is detected in areas
such as improving public engagement, the UK reg-
ulatory process has been open to the accusation of a
scientific community regulating itself.  This paper
recommends that in order to avoid any possible
complacency further improvements in public inclu-
siveness and interdisciplinary representation on
regulatory committees should be sought.   
Key Words: Science, Society, Stem Cells,
Regulation, Consultation, Government.
The United Kingdom is often portrayed as one of
the most liberal environments for Stem Cell
Research (SCR hereafter) and whilst this is increas-
ingly challenged by the emergence of research in
countries such as South Korea1 and the public/pri-
vate divide2 in the United States, the UK remains at
the forefront, and so well placed to exploit any pos-
sible therapeutic applications.  The development of
the regulatory and legal framework in the UK, like
that in other countries, is shaped to an extent by
national cultural contexts which may or may not be
in tension with emergent transnational or global
regulatory frameworks within, for example, the
European Union or the United Nations.  This paper
charts the evolution of the regulatory apparatus in
the UK in regards to SCR in order to probe the histo-
ry and context of this process as well as to assess its
preparedness for the future.  Moreover, in
analysing the appropriateness, adequacy and effec-
tiveness of the UK regulatory and legislative struc-
ture in regard to human SCR, problems, solutions,
and possible failures, including potential lessons
for Europe will be outlined.  
Although not the main focus of this paper I shall
begin by briefly situating UK regulation on SCR
within the context of the European Union.  The con-
troversy of such regulation occurs largely through
the reduction of the issue to that of the regulation
of embryo research.  This framing of the issue is of
course up for contention.  However it is at least
partly down to research in identifying embryos as
the best source for pluripotent stem cells – that is to
say, those which may be open to the most varied
degree of differentiation and so, it is hoped, the
best therapeutic potential, that frames the issue.
In spite of this one might still wish to question this
reductionism since other research may in the
future show the utility of non-embryonic sources of
stem cells or even success in the goal of manipulat-
ing cells into acts of ‘self-reprogramming’3.  Even
present research into stem cells occurs on non-
embryonic sources such as cadaveric fetal tissue and
therapies have already been used from umbilical
cord stem cells.  It is thus misleading to narrow the
debate to embryos when we discuss stem cell regu-
lation but it is such a course of events which has
also inevitably entailed the regulatory re-amplifica-
tion of prior arguments about the status of the
embryo, more familiar to debates around abortion
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1 In early 2004 South Korean scientists successfully
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ther information, see  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
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rights.  This construction may be deemed further
problematic in that ethical debates around embryos
are prone to take place in a disembodied manner
which abstracts them from women’s bodies.  If SCR
is to an extent to rely upon the altruistic donation
of embryos from women and/or couples undergoing
in vitro fertilisation (IVF) or pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis4 (PGD), this seems like an impor-
tant oversight.  
The likelihood of European harmonisation in a
permissive direction on SCR is at present compro-
mised by a polarisation which largely revolves
around this issue of embryo research.  For example,
the comparatively permissive countries of the UK
and Belgium5 presently stand in marked contrast to
Germany, Austria and Italy.  Whilst presumably
harmonisation would make the EU an attractive
location for economic investment and expertise in
SCR and embryology generally, it is presently
unlikely in a European regulatory environment
which respects both pluralism and subsidiarity.
Indeed the issue provides a good example of the lat-
ter as, in this case, indicative of different cultural
histories and religious traditions.  In spite of this
pluralism there is, as Solter et. al. point out, eco-
nomic pressure on more prohibitive countries not
to lose out on both the prestige of novel science and
potential economic advantage, consequently they
hypothesize a gradual move toward an EU harmon-
isation on allowing embryo research (2003, 152/153).
Recent evidence in support of their hypothesis is
mixed and their prediction principally assumes an
economic determinism.  For example, new restric-
tive Italian legislation, which was condemned by
the European Society of Human Reproduction and
Embryology, offers a high degree of protection to
embryos, banning PGD and restricting IVF6.  Also in
December 2003 EU research ministers failed to
agree on whether to spend EU money on research
with new embryonic stem cells, but agreed to
assess each new application on a case by case basis
within its 6th Research Framework Programme
(FP6).  Such developments then cast doubt on a
move toward permissive EU harmonisation and it is
against such a backdrop that UK regulations, in
particular on embryonic SCR, stand out as a good
potential basis for capturing both scientific
research expertise and prestige; as well as the
potential of economic advantage. The critical
moment in the UK with regards to permitting
research on embryos and so enabling embryonic
SCR were the regulations that were passed in 2001
as additions to the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act, 1990 (HFE Act hereafter).  This
paper will now focus on the evolution of the UK reg-
ulatory apparatus leading up to and since this point
in time.  
The Warnock Report and the 1990 HFE ACT
In 1978 the UK was the location for the birth of
the first IVF baby. This can ultimately be seen to
have had important consequences for the regula-
tion of embryonic SCR.  In an interesting parallel to
what we have witnessed more recently in relation to
scientific developments such as cloning, the first
IVF baby brought into relief a ‘legal vacuum’
(Franklin, 1999: 61) around practices related to
assisted conception.  In spite of the initial vacuum
the UK had a head start in comparison to other
countries in thinking through the legal, social and
ethical issues around IVF.  A committee was
appointed by the government in 1982 and published
in 1984, after the name of its chair, The Warnock
Report7.  Although a general report on assisted con-
ception the most contentious of its  recommenda-
tions related to the issue of embryo research.  The
recommendations of the Warnock Report which
later formed the basis of the HFE Act 1990, devised
regulations for the treatment of embryos in IVF
research and practice.  These recommendations car-
ried with them an ethical compromise at a point
between sacralisation and instrumentalisation,
and set the early context for what would later regu-
late SCR.  This UK position which has been referred
to as the ‘proportionality’ position (Solter et. al.,
2003: 123), affords the embryo a proportional moral
status, which is neither an absolutist statement of
intrinsic value nor a wholly perspective of open util-
ity.  This is of course a position which allows
research on embryos within limits. Thus the
Warnock Report recommended that “The embryo of the
human species should be afforded some protection in law”
(1985: 84) and crucially that ”legislation should provide
4 Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis is a form of early
pre-natal diagnosis performed on couples who are at
risk of giving birth to a child with a serious disorder,
for example, a sex linked condition.  PGD allows a
‘healthy’ embryo to be selected from a sample, and so
like IVF produces a number of ‘surplus’ or ‘spare’
embryos. 
5  In April 2003 Belgium passed legislation allowing the
creation of embryos for research (for further details see
Pennings 2003).
6 This was passed by the Italian Senate on 11th December
2003, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe
/3311031.stm
7 This was also published in 1985 as ‘A Question of Life –
The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and
Embryology’.  It is from this version that I quote. 
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that research may be carried out on any embryo resulting from
in vitro fertilisation, whatever its provenance, up to the end of
the fourteenth day after fertilisation, but subject to all other
restrictions as may be imposed by the licensing body” (ibid.).
Whilst the former recommendation expresses the
‘proportionality’ position, the latter fixes that limit
of utility at fourteen days.  As we shall see,
although intended at first for assisted conception
research this limit has come to be a foundational
definition for all research involving embryos and
now applies to scientists seeking to derive pluripo-
tent stem cell lines.  Moreover, the 14 day limit has
found its way onto the statute books of other coun-
tries such as Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands,
Greece, Spain and most recently Belgium.  On the
face of it the 14 day limit was based upon at least
two observations from developmental embryology.
First it is argued that since twinning of an embryo
only occurs prior to fourteen days it is more diffi-
cult to conceptualise the embryo as a distinct indi-
vidual during that period.  Second fourteen days
has been identified as the time at which the embryo
develops a ‘primitive streak’, the beginnings of sys-
temic cell differentiation and the formation of what
will be the neural system.  Some commentators and
indeed some regulators who have employed this
limit have conceded that it is in part an arbitrary
standard.  The point on twinning could be seen as a
weak argument since it is a relatively rare occur-
rence and so it would seem a good general principle
that in most cases the embryo prior to fourteen days
exhibits a strong degree of potentiality for ulti-
mately being born as an individual8.  Moreover it
seems a strange fetishization of the individual to
assume that the moral worth of one individual
would be greater than that of two.  It has also been
suggested that the fourteen day limit was more
research led rather than based upon scientific facts
or ethics given that that was the time for which
embryos could be kept alive in vitro (Fleming & Pike,
2002).  
In spite of this arbitrariness the limit stood and
the definition coalesced and spread.  It would influ-
ence the terms of the debate in the mid to late 1980s
in the run up to the HFE Act.  As Franklin recounts
this time saw the emergence of pro-life groups
opposed to either IVF itself or to the research upon,
or disposal of ‘spare’ embryos (1999: 62).  This
inspired a concerted strategic response from the
Medical Research Council (MRC) and other parts of
the UK science establishment in an attempt to
ensure that the then forthcoming Bill would
legalise embryo research.  One element of this was
the construction of the ‘pre-embryo’, a category
that was wholly enabled by the prior fourteen day
limit of the Warnock Report.  Franklin pinpointed
the ‘birth’ of the term ‘pre-embryo’ to a 1987 New
Scientist article written by an embryologist from the
MRC (op. cit. pp. 65-67).  The description of the
embryo before fourteen days as a ‘pre-embryo’ or
the variant ‘early embryo’ had the effect of moral
devaluation, and in as much, added a veneer of sci-
entific legitimation to the case for embryo
research9.
Although the Warnock Report and its media rep-
resentation contributed to the amplification and
polarisation of debates on embryo research, as well
as a partial return to abortion ethics, after much
debate its recommendations finally formed the
basis for the HFE Act 1990.  This Act led to the estab-
lishment of the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority (HFEA) which in addition to
its role in regulating and overseeing IVF was given
powers to license embryo research.  At this stage
the Act only permitted research on embryos “which
increases knowledge about the creation and development of
embryos, or about disease, or enables such knowledge to be
applied”10. Such research was legitimated for the fol-
lowing five purposes: (i) promoting advances in the
treatment of infertility, ii) increasing knowledge
about the causes of congenital disease, (iii) increas-
ing knowledge about the causes of miscarriages,
(iv) developing more effective techniques of contra-
ception, or (v) developing methods for detecting the
presence of gene or chromosome abnormalities in
embryos before implantation11.  Licenses can only
be granted if the HFEA is satisfied that any pro-
posed use of embryos is necessary for a given
research project.  The Act also includes precise rules
of consent by which no embryo can be used for
research in vitro without each gamete donor granti-
ng specific consent for a designated research pur-
8 It is of course a slightly different argument as to
whether any embryo or foetus could be considered an
individual due to fundamental reliance on its mother. 
9 Although the concept of a ‘pre-embryo’ was an impor-
tant actor in the rhetorics of the debate it is worth not-
ing that in the HFE Act, ‘embryo’ is defined as ‘a live
human embryo where fertilisation is complete’, that is
to say, prior to fourteen days.  The term ‘early embryo’
could be seen to operate in a similar, if perhaps not
quite as instrumentalising a manner. 
10 The Act is available online, for this line please refer to
paragraph 3, point 3 at http://www.legislation.
hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1990/Ukpga_19900037_en_4.ht
m#sdiv2
11 All of this specific section is to be found at http://
www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1990/Ukpga_1
9900037_en_4.htm#sdiv2
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pose.  Moreover it states that donors must receive
an opportunity for counselling on possible implica-
tions for consent to be valid, and that donors must
be provided with relevant information.  Storage of
embryos is dependent upon being granted by the
female gamete donor.  The regulations for consent
are rigorous but omit issues of timing (see Herder
2002: 16/17) which are important since the context
at which consent is sought may be relevant to a per-
son’s decision and the phrase ‘relevant information’
is arguably somewhat open ended12.  It should be
noted that the HFE Act 1990 makes no mention of
stem cells and it is not until the late 1990s that a
consultation process begins which culminates in
the statutory instrument being added to the Act -
legalising embryonic SCR in January 200113.  This
paper shall now review this consultation process,
outline challenges and reviews of the statutory
instrument post-January 2001, and finally subse-
quent developments, notably the establishment of
the UK Stem Cell Bank in January 200314. 
One criticism that may be made of  UK regulato-
ry measures of SCR is that the scope of public con-
sultation has not had the same reach as in other
European countries such as Germany or Sweden.
For example, there has been no concerted public
engagement exercise on the scale of the 2003 GM
Nation exercise (the consultation on genetically
modified crops). Yet this may reflect the govern-
mental attitude to consultation which it has gradu-
ally begun to take more seriously in recent years.
Thus the consultation on SCR, particularly that ini-
tiated in the late 1990s around the use of ‘therapeu-
tic cloning’ techniques followed the model15 of con-
sulting with larger bodies such as religious groups,
scientific bodies and interest groups.  The danger of
such a narrow consultation is that it does not ade-
quately respect societal plurality.  In a similar
respect to bioethics bodies and religious groups it is
relevant to probe which disciplines and/or ethical
approaches are given most weight in the former,
and which theological perspectives are heard in the
latter.
The HFEA/HGAC Consultaion
In January 1998 the HFEA and the Human
Genetics Advisory Commission (HGAC16) launched a
joint consultation on human cloning entitled,
‘Cloning Issues in Reproduction, Science and Medicine’.
Although about cloning generally this consultation
was of direct importance to the future of embryon-
ic SCR in the UK since it sought to elicit views upon
the potential therapeutic benefits of cloning as a
technique for deriving stem cells.  Indeed it is at
this point in the regulatory process that one may
observe the discursive strengthening of a differenti-
ation between therapeutic and reproductive
cloning.  This has been referred to as the “rhetorical
severing of therapeutic cloning from reproductive cloning”
(Parry, 2003: 147).  In its introduction the consulta-
tion states, “It is important to make the distinction between
human embryo research, which may be permitted under license
under the 1990 Act and reproductive cloning, where an embryo
is implanted into a women’s womb” (HFEA/HGAC, 1999:
15).  Thus although one type of human embryo
research and reproductive cloning essentially
involve the same technology of cell nuclear replace-
ment (CNR), this and subsequent regulatory and
legal documents differentiate the two in terms of
intentionality and argue against any ‘slippery slope’
critique by the recommendation, and then enact-
ment, of an explicit ban on the implantation of a
cloned embryo into a women’s womb17.  The main
purpose of the consultation document in respect to
therapeutic cloning was to ask for views on whether
any additional ethical concerns may be brought into
play by adding to the provision and scope of embryo
research contained in the HFE Act 1990.  The con-
sultation paper was disseminated and responses
were invited until April 30th 1998.  Just under 200
responses were received with about 40% from indi-
vidual members of the public and the remainder
from professional bodies, religious organisations
12 The section of the Act on consent is available here
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1990/U
kpga_19900037_en_5.htm#sdiv3
13 Statutory Instrument 2001 No.188 [The Human
Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes)
Regulations 2001] may be viewed online at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20010
188.htm
14 The Stem Cell Bank was officially opened for the
deposit of samples in May 2004. 
15 The difference I am trying to allude to here reflects dif-
ferences in depth since some consultation exercises
will axiomatically take certain bodies as public repre-
sentatives, or more ambitiously as in GM Nation, some
will seek a more direct public engagement and attempt
to involve those who had otherwise been disinterested
on a given issue. 
16 The HGAC along with the Advisory Committee on
Genetic Testing and the Advisory Group on Scientific
Advances in Genetics were wound up in a governmen-
tal streamlining exercise in 1999; their respective roles
being taken on by the new Human Genetics
Commission (HGC).  
17 The advantage of using therapeutic cloning to create
embryos for stem cell applications is that unlike
embryos obtained form IVF or PGD they are an exact
match with the donor.  The UK ban on reproductive
cloning is contained in the Human Reproductive
Cloning Act, 2001. 
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and lay groups. Once collated the HFEA and HGAC
published its report of the same name in December
1998.  Introducing its findings on the therapeutic
cloning section the report states “Some thought that
the distinction between reproductive cloning and therapeutic
cloning was arbitrary, others just responded negatively to any-
thing described as ”cloning” and some were upset at the
description of identical twins as a ‘natural form of cloning’.  It
is clear that the word ‘cloning’ carries an automatic stigma for
many because of its association with imagery such as that por-
trayed in Brave New World. To avoid this confusion this section
of the report has been headed ‘Therapeutic Uses of Cell Nucleus
Replacement (CNR)’ and concentrates on new techniques
which might be developed to treat serious medical conditions”
(1998: 19). This is a curious passage since it seems to
respond to fears of intentional obfuscation with a
further change in wording that seeks to escape the
perceived negative connotation of ‘cloning’.
Moreover, the change in terminology instigated
here would later be criticised in the House of
Commons in November 2000 when Ann Winterton
MP argued that the UK regulatory apparatus had
substituted ‘cloning’ for the more morally neutral
‘cell nuclear replacement’(HC Debate 17 November
2000, column 1196)18 The implication then is not
that the change in terminology was, as the above
passage suggests, to ‘avoid confusion’ but that it
was more about constructing consent to a new tech-
nique by using less stigmatised language.  Strategic
games with language aside, the HFEA/HGAC report
summarised findings from its consultation and
found that whilst 80% were against reproductive
cloning, 55% thought that there were scientific
areas that might benefit from research involving
CNR, compared with 10% who did not (op cit, p. 38).
The report recommended that the government
could introduce more explicit legislation banning
reproductive cloning, and of more relevance to SCR,
that two further research purposes be added to the
five already specified in the HFE Act 1990 (see
above).  These two extra purposes were i) developing
methods of therapy for mitochondrial disease, and
ii) developing methods of therapy for disease or
damaged tissues or organs.  The latter purpose flags
the regenerative potential of stem cells. 
In June 1999 the government published a positive
response to the HFEA/HGAC consultation and
report.  Tessa Jowell MP, the then Minister for
Public Health, articulated that “The Government reaf-
firms its policy that human reproductive cloning is ethically
unacceptable and cannot take place in this country. However,
we recognise that regulations to allow therapeutic research
should be very carefully considered”19.  This stated need
for further careful consideration led to the govern-
ment instigating an ‘independent expert advisory
group’ to be chaired by the Chief Medical Officer,
Professor Liam Donaldson.  This became the next
stage in the regulatory process which was now
becoming increasingly specific to the issue of SCR
and its associated legal and ethical issues.  Other
similar reports were concurrent and before the
Donaldson Report was published in June 2000, the
Nuffield Council on Bioethics produced a discussion
paper entitled ‘Stem Cell Therapy: The Ethical
Issues’ in April 2000. 
The Nuffield Report fed into what would become
the Donaldson Report when it gave a preliminary
presentation of its findings to the Donaldson advi-
sory group in November 199920.  In the absence of
any government instigated bioethics body, akin to
the US model, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics is
the most prominent UK national body.  It describes
itself as an independent body which receives its
funding from the Nuffield Foundation, the Medical
Research Council and the Wellcome Trust.  Yet it
offers its own definition of bioethics since its
objects of interest are typically focussed upon new
innovation in science and a large proportion of its
members are scientists.  At the time of the Stem
Cell Therapy report, at least half of it’s 14 members
were scientists.  If the role of bioethics is to provide
a thorough and interdisciplinary examination of
science and technology it is reasonable to draw
attention to the low number of philosophers and
absence of social scientists on the Council, as well
as its funding base. 
In common with the HFEA/HGAC view the main
recommendation of the Nuffield report was that
the government should provide additional research
contexts for embryo research to those already spec-
ified in the HFE Act 1990.  On the question of creat-
ing new embryos for research the Council thought
there was ‘no compelling reason’ as long as ‘spare’
embryos were available from IVF, but that this
should be kept under review21.  This was a similar
18 See also Sleator (2000) and Parry (2003). 
19 The text of the Government response is available
online at http://www.dh.gov.uk/ PublicationsAnd
Statistics/PressReleases/PressReleasesNotices/fs/
en?CONTENT_ID=4025446&chk=0zNabK
20 The Donaldson Report also received advisory submis-
sions on therapeutic cloning from groups such as The
Royal Society, but I focus here on the Nuffield submis-
sion due to its ethical content. 
21 It should be noted that when the Nuffield Report was
written a number of embryos had already been created
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position to the US National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (NBAC), but one that would be overri-
den by the subsequent Donaldson Report (see below
and Holm, 2002: 505).  Furthermore, the report
offered useful recommendations in the areas of con-
sent, patenting and on the drivation of stem cells
from fetal tissue.  Due to the theorised immortality
of stem cell lines the Council argued that the use of
embryonic tissue inspired novel consent issues and
so argued that embryo donors should be asked
explicitly for consent to that research and subse-
quent therapeutic use of that stem cell line22.  This
concurred with the recommendations of NBAC that
donors would be told that there would be no med-
ical benefit from being donors, that sources of fund-
ing and expected commercial benefits from the
research be disclosed, that no donated embryos
would be implanted in a woman and that research
would include the destruction of their embryos.
Looking ahead to potential therapies and the estab-
lishment of methods for generating stem cell lines
the Council argued strongly against the granting of
‘over generous patents with strong claims’ as they
may act to restrict stem cell research overall.  On
this issue it was not until April 2003 that the UK
Patent Office issued a clarifying notice entitled
‘Inventions involving human embryonic stem
cells’23. Stressing consistency with the Patents Act
1977 this stated that both ‘processes for obtaining
stem cells from human embryos’ and ‘human totipo-
tent cells’ were not patentable, the latter due to the
potential of such cells to develop into an entire
human body.  However it did rule that patents would
be issued for ‘human embryonic pluripotent stem
cells’ arguing that their commercial exploitation
would “not be contrary to public policy or morality in the
United Kingdom” (see end. 21).  Laurie has questioned
this totipotent/pluripotent patenting distinction
given that the stage at which cells change from
totipotency to pluripotency is difficult to pinpoint
and that the former quality can only be demonstrat-
ed by growing them (2004: 63).  Consequently future
UK patents on stem cells will be required to careful-
ly ensure that their research involves cells which are
definitively pluripotent. Finally it would be hoped
that the Patent Office would take on board the rec-
ommendation of the Nuffield Report to prevent
patents that are too general. 
The Nuffield Report also commented upon a sig-
nificant non-embryonic source of stem cells in its
recommendations for the derivation of stem cells
from fetal tissue.  At this point it refers back to the
1989 Polkinghorne guidelines which comprise a
non-statuatory code of pratice for research uses of
fetal tissue obtained from abortions.  The report
points out that in contrast to embryonic tissue, the
therapeutic and research use of fetal tissue does not
require a license but each proposal is regulated by
research ethics committees.  It re-emphasises the
importance of the Polkinghorne stipulation that a
women’s decision to abort and any discussions of
therapeutic uses of fetal tissue must be separated so
as not to incentivise abortion, as well as the
Polkinghorne consent principle that a general writ-
ten consent should be obtained from the mother for
all permissable research purposes.  This consent proce-
dure also involves the provision of ‘counselling and
comprehensible information’.  Whilst concurring
with the Polkinghorne regulations generally the
Nuffield Report advised that since the Polkinghorne
general explicit consent principle conflicts with a
specific consent procedure of informing donors that
donated tissue will be used for SCR (as with embryonic
tissue) the question ought to be considered further
by the Donaldson Report. 
It is interesting to note that in a later HGC con-
sultation (on Human Genetic Databases, named
‘Whose hands on Your Genes?’) Professor Robert
Shaw of the Royal College of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists is very critical of The Polkinghorne
Guidelines including its consent principle.
Specifically Shaw argues that a general explicit con-
sent in which no information is offered is “an
anachronism in an open, modern society, opposed to all other
instances of research consent, harmful to women who often
take an interest in the research and who derive psychological
benefit from the knowledge that they may be helping scientific
research and  mankind, and is likely to be contested in the
courts”24.  It is perhaps surprising then at this stage
of the regulatory process that the Nuffield Report
did not raise some of these concerns, saying only
that it would be ‘consistent’ for a specific special
consent to be sought for the derivation of stem cell
lines from fetal tissue.  As long as this more open
for research purposes in the UK.  Specifically between
August 1991 and March 1999, 53, 497 embryos from IVF
programmes were donated from and 118 were created
for research (POST 2002: 4).
22 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report ‘Stem Cell
Therapy – The Ethical Issues’ is available from
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/filelibrary/doc/ste
m_cell_therapy2.doc
23 This is available at http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/
notices/practice/stemcells.htm
24 As of April 2004 The Polkinghorne Guidelines are cur-
rently being reviewed. Please refer to Professor Shaw’s
response at  http://www.hgc.gov.uk/whoygconsulta-
tion_responses/rcobsgyn.htm
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consent principle was not enacted at the wrong
time, one could assume that it would not interfere
with a woman’s decision to have an abortion or not.
However when the issue was taken up by the
Donaldson Report later in 2000 it said little more
than was stated in Nuffield concluding that the
Polkinghorne Code of Practice should be reviewed to
consider whether a specific consent should be sought
from women when fetal tissue is used for SCR25.
The Donaldson Report 
The main focus of the report, entitled “Stem Cell
Research: Medical Progress with Responsibility”, is very
much upon embryonic SCR with the goal of extending
the research purposes of the 1990 HFE Act.
Although a report that considers both the legal and
ethical aspects of SCR the Chief Medical Officer’s
Advisory Group assembled to compile the
Donaldson Report was compiled predominantly of
scientists, significantly more so than the Nuffield
Report.  Of the 14 individuals, 11 were scientists, 1
was a scientist/theologian/fellow of the Royal
Society (John Polkinghorne), only 1 was an ethicist
(Alistair Campbell) and only 1 was a legal specialist
(Derek Morgan).  Scientific representation within
the regulatory process of SCR is of course vital - yet
with such a skewed representation the UK science
establishment leaves itself open to accusations of
self-policing.  Moreover there is the associated dan-
ger that it may miss important ethical or social
aspects.
The Donaldson Report situated itself temporally
within a regulatory timeline of the Warnock Report
and the 1990 HFE Act.  Understandably its aim was
not to repeat the debates contained therein on the
ethics of embryo research but to consider specifical-
ly whether the use of embryos for the derivation of
stem cells presented any new ethical issues.
Drawing upon the previous decisions of the
Warnock Committee and the rulings of the 1990
HFE Act the report concludes that the proposed
extension of the research uses of embryos did not
raise fundamentally new issues: “The position encap-
sulated in the 1990 Act is that it is permissible to undertake
research which involves the use (and inevitable destruction) of
embryos where there is good reason to believe that such use will
lead to improvements in, for example, infertility treatment or
the understanding of congenital disease”26.  Indeed one
can argue that since SCR could lead to therapies for
such a wide range of conditions that its public
health reward would make the proposed new
research use of embryos more ethically sound than
those already legalised under the HFE Act27 (albeit
with the ethics resting somewhat uncomfortably
on the word ‘could’).  The Donaldson Report then
goes on to consider the ethics of creating embryos
for research, an act which is generally taken to
involve a deeper level of instrumentality.  Although
‘spare’ embryos from IVF and PGD provide sources
of research embryos, the creation of embryos
specifically using CNR provides an opportunity to,
in the words of the report, “investigate the mechanisms
for reprogramming adult cells and to establish whether tissue
can be developed which is compatible with the intended recipi-
ent”28.  The report concluded, as with the ethical
trade off with other prior uses of embryos, that
their creation by CNR should be permitted owing to
its therapeutic promise as long as it was rigorously
controlled by the HFEA.  Licenses should only be
granted when the creation of embryos were a neces-
sary element of the research.  This formed one of
nine recommendations made by the Donaldson
Report. Alongside the recommendation that
research using embryos to increase understanding
about human disease and disorders should be per-
mitted formed the thrust of the report.  Other
important elements were the reiteration of the ille-
gality of reproductive cloning, the need for specific
consent to be sought from individuals whose eggs
or sperm are used to create embryos which are
donated for SCR, a call for UK research councils to
establish a programme for SCR29 and to consider
the feasibility of establishing centralised collec-
tions of stem cell lines for research – later to become
the UK Stem Cell Bank. 
The government response to the Donaldson
Report was to accept its recommendations in full.
Later in 2000 the government introduced these reg-
ulations for parliamentary debate where a free vote
25 This in spite of John Polkinghorne being part of the
Donaldson Report Advisory Group. See Paragraph 4.29,
on page 42 of the Donaldson Report ‘SCR: Medical
Progress with Responsibility’ which may be viewed
online at http://www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/06/
50/85/04065085.pdf
26 Paragraph 4.12 p.39.
27 See Paragraph 4.27 p.41/42.
28 Paragraph 4.14 p.40.
29 In 2002 the government provided £40m. The MRC
received £26 million, the BBSRC received £10 million
and the ESRC £1.8 million. The physical sciences
Councils received small allocations to help develop key
technologies.  Successful applicants to each research
council call for proposals began their research in mid
2004.  In May 2004 a total of 57 multi-disciplinary
research grants were awarded, see
http://www.mrc.ac.uk/index/public-interest/public-
press_office/public-press_releases_2004/public-
27_may_2004.htm  
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was permitted.  In the run up to this debate several
oppositional groups gave responses on the subject.
LIFE, which describes itself as the UK’s leading pro-
life charity30 articulated its opposition by first argu-
ing for alternative sources of pluripotent stem cells
and second by aligning itself with the more cau-
tious European position on ‘therapeutic’ cloning.
The Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child
(SPUC31) also allied itself to a European context,
supporting a resolution from the European
Parliament that had accused the UK separation of
‘therapeutic’ and ‘reproductive’ cloning as a ‘lin-
guistic sleight of hand’ (see Sleator, 2000: 49).
SPUC was also unhappy that the HFEA included a
‘strong representation from the test-tube baby
industry’ echoing the previous criticism of ‘self-
policing’.  The UK Catholic Church was also
opposed, whilst the  Church of England and the
Chief Rabbi offered cautious approval.  LIFE and
SPUC were strategically correct to avoid arguing
against the proposals on the grounds that embryo
research was morally wrong (even though this was
and is their underlying position) since the response
would have been simply that that debate had
already taken place at the time of Warnock and the
1990 HFE Act.  By shifting their critique to the
sphere of science and by proffering a European
alignment they could have more chance of being
heard and less chance of being dismissed as ‘irra-
tional’.  However, in the UK regulatory process,
dominated as it has been by scientists, pro-life posi-
tions fundamentally against embryo research are
portrayed as one extreme end of a moral continuum
– the other being unfettered instrumentalism.
Thus the Donaldson Report was able to present its
own permissive position as the rational middle
ground between two extremes in a similar manner
to Warnock (see Kerr, 2003: 120).  Of course one
might point to the minority status of the pro-life
view in the UK and SPUC’s own linguistic sleights of
hand in describing an embryo or foetus as an
‘unborn child’ as a defence of its regulatory margin-
alisation.  However, whilst it would not have been
democratic, one assumes, for this position to have
held sway in the UK it is still worth underlining its
‘management’ within the wider regulatory process.  
The House of Lords select Committee on SCR
In spite of some similarly articulated opposition
in the House of Commons debate the additional
statutory instrument to the 1990 HFE Act was
passed in January 2001 with the three further con-
texts under which embryo research could be
licensed by the HFEA worded as i) increasing knowl-
edge about development of embryos, ii) increasing
knowledge about serious disease and iii) enabling
any such knowledge to be applied in developing
treatment for serious disease.  The addition of the
word ‘serious’ was to avoid what may be seen as
more frivolous applications of embryonic SCR, but
would later cause problems owing to a lack of defin-
ition of what constituted ‘serious disease’.  On the
7th March 2001 the House of Lords agreed a motion
appointing a Select Committee to oversee both the
rapidly changing field of SCR and to report back on
issues related to research arising from the new
statutory instrument.  Moreover, unlike the
Donaldson report, the committee took an interest
in reviewing whether some of the conclusions of
the Warnock Report and the 1990 HFE Act still
applied. The committee was asked to compile its
own report which also became a significant public
consultation exercise in the context of the UK regu-
latory process outlined in this paper32.  In April 2001
the committee issued a call for evidence on the eth-
ical, legal, scientific, medical and commercial
issues surrounding the regulations as they now
stood.  This stage represented a commendable part
of the UK regulatory process on SCR.  Instead of tak-
ing some regulatory respite after the passing of the
additional statutory instrument the formation of
the Select Committee introduced a deeper stage of
regulatory self-reflexivity as well as the widest pub-
lic consultation on the subject to date.  Arguably
this was related to a new stress on the importance
of both transparency and public consultation in the
Labour government at this time. The Committee
took the remainder of 2001 to undertake the accu-
mulation of evidence and the subsequent compila-
tion of their report.  
In the meantime a case brought by Bruno
Quintavalle of the Pro-Life Alliance challenged the
government on whether the 1990 HFE Act had in
fact any jurisdiction over cloning research.
Quintavalle argued that an embryo produced by
CNR did not comply with the definition of an
embryo under the Act because its creation did not
involve fertilisation.  The High Court agreed decid-
30 http://www.lifeuk.org/
31 http://www.spuc.org.uk/
32 The report by the House of Lords Select Committee on
SCR is available online here http://www. parlia-
ment.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200102/ldse-
lect/ldstem/83/8301.htm and the list of organisations
and individuals who responded to the call for evidence
can be found in Appendix 3 here  http://www.parlia-
ment.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200102/ldse-
lect/ldstem/ 83/ 8313.htm
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ing the challenge valid.  The implication of this was
that now no forms of cloning fell under the 1990
HFE Act.  Consequently the government acted
rapidly to ban reproductive cloning, something it
thought it had already done, with the passing in a
little over two weeks later of the Human Reproductive
Cloning Act 200133.  This left a considerable problem
over the use of CNR for ‘therapeutic cloning’ and the
government simultaneously launched an appeal
over the court’s decision.  On January 18th 2002 the
High Court ruled in favour of the government’s
appeal justifying its decision on the basis of ‘purpo-
sive construction’.  This doctrine, often used in
patent rulings, allows the original context and
intentionality to be taken into account.  This was
ruled to be relevant in this case since CNR had not
yet reached viability in 1990.  In the opinion of the
High Court “embryos created by CNR fell within the genus of
those of the Act” (R v Secretary of State for Health ex
parte Quintavalle, 2001) and to rule otherwise
would be to defeat the purposes of that Act34.  The
Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child
(SPUC) accused the Court of interpreting the law in
a very elastic way and that extending the definition
of an embryo should be a Parliamentary decision,
not a Court matter. This was a fortunate ruling for
the government and research community avoiding
the need for a more radical revision of legislation.
This case and the concurrent consultation by the
House of Lords Select Committee made this period a
busy time for the UK regulatory procedure.  The
month after the High Court ruling the select com-
mittee presented it’s report.  The Committee’s
wider reach in terms of public consultation, alluded
to above, brought in a range of opinion beyond the
scientific establishment and pro-life groups that
had been the familiar actors in the regulatory
process.  Oral and/or written submissions were
given by a range of patient groups, bioethics cen-
tres, and what may be described as secular opposi-
tional groups such as Human Genetics Alert and the
Institute of Science in Society35.  On the more criti-
cal side there remained what was arguably an
important gap in the consultation process in that
there continued to be a marked absence of pro-fem-
inist groups, or feminist bioethicists.  Given the
overlap of SCR with assisted conception technolo-
gies of IVF and PGD, together with the invasiveness
of such procedures on women’s bodies this is an
exclusion that is difficult to account for.  Rose
(2004) was justified in her criticism that through-
out the UK regulatory process women have been
underrepresented on the various committees (The
House of Lords Select Committee was, as she
acknowledges, an exception with women forming
the majority of its membership).  However it is sim-
plistic to assume that greater female representation
will entail a better airing of issues of special rele-
vance to women.  For example, in spite of Rose’s
contention otherwise, the House of Lords Select
Committee generally took the same view on the cre-
ation of embryos for research as prior regulatory
committees (see below).  The process of ovulation
induction using gonadotrophin drugs to artificially
stimulate a women’s ovaries to overproduce eggs
may carry side effects and lead to the development
of Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome. This raises
its own ethical issues for assisted conception tech-
nologies yet the lack of discussion of their gendered
experience has been surprising in the regulatory
process.  Even if embryonic SCR does not directly at
this point in time increase the number of women
undergoing ovulation induction, its normalisation
has the potential to indirectly provide further ratio-
nale for the technological framing and intervention
into women’s bodies.  Since SCR has been regulated
in the UK by adding to pre-existing legislation
aimed at IVF, rather than having it’s own separate
legislation, and that both are controlled by the
HFEA, the technologies are more likely to evolve
interdependently with the result being a mutual co-
naturalisation.  The inclusion of novel critical voic-
es in the Select Committee consultation then was a
step in the right direction but arguably did not go
far enough.  The terms of the debate have also
received criticism for a focus on the status of the
embryo portrayed as abstract from women’s bodies
or a reduction of women’s ethical significance to
being just about providing consent (e.g. Dickenson,
2002).  Whilst the literal removal of embryos and
eggs from women’s bodies may inspire one strand
of oppositional voice the reduction of ethical debate
to individual issues of consent and privacy does risk
a closure of other important issues.  For example, a
fuller assessment of the social and ethical impact of
SCR could examine more closely its potential
impact upon women undergoing assisted concep-
tion technologies and begin to consider consulting
on the long term impact it may have on questions of
33 This very succinct act is available to view online at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/2
0010023.htm
34 Quintavalle in turn unsuccessfully challenged this rul-
ing, with the High Court dismissing his appeal in
March 2003. 
35 The anti-therapeutic cloning stance of the Institute
can be viewed here http://www.i-sis.org.uk/
ISISsubmission.php
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‘enhancement’ related to ageing and the human
lifespan.   
The Select Committee consultation and report
attempted to probe a series of old and new ques-
tions. These included whether the additional pur-
poses in the 2001 Regulations raised issues of prin-
ciple different from the purposes specified in the
1990 Act, whether international commercial devel-
opments such as e-commerce and patenting
changed the context of the debate in the UK,
whether the potential of non-embryonic sources of
stem cells had improved and whether the HFEA
required any additional regulatory guidelines to
assist its work in issuing research licences. 
Sections of the report concluded by reinforcing
many of the ethical principles and decisions of ear-
lier regulatory stages.  For example its review of the
status of the ‘early embryo’ (it is of course impor-
tant to note that the phrase ‘early embryo’ had now
received regulatory normalisation) backed up both
the Warnock and HFEA view that research ought to
be permitted and that creating embryos for
research ought only be allowed if there was a
demonstrable and exceptional need.  But a signifi-
cant amount of the report was geared toward new
developments. For example, it reviewed recent
research on adult stem cells (including those
obtained from the placenta and umbilical cord),
concluding that they were promising in terms of
cell type differentiation potential. Consequently
government funding of these avenues was strongly
encouraged.  Importantly the report also concluded
that CNR should be allowed for basic research pur-
poses and satisfaction was expressed with the regu-
latory powers of the HFEA in regards to preventing
the application of CNR for reproductive cloning.
Moreover, the report deliberated over the ambigui-
ty that took place after the introduction of the word
‘serious’ in the phrase ‘serious disease’ in the 2001
statutory instrument. The Committee recommend-
ed that the government and the HFEA draw up
guidelines as to what constituted serious disease.
Recommendations on consent were to standardize
the separation of clinical and research roles in egg
or embryo donation.  This came after the
Committee had visited several clinics and had been
satisfied that consent was being sought openly and
without pressure.  The separation of these roles
would further assuage any fear that moral pressure
was a part of the consent process.  Furthermore,
given the potential ‘immortality’ of embryonic
stem cell lines it was advised that when informed
consent was specifically sought for use of embryos
for SCR that no specific constraint should be placed
on the future use of those cells.  The report also
indicated what would become the next step in the
regulatory process with its endorsement of the gov-
ernment’s decision to establish a UK Stem Cell
Bank, under which all research projects granted
license by the HFEA would be required to deposit
any stem cell lines generated.  A regulatory shift
could now be noted as the focus began to move
downstream, to storage procedures and in a very
preliminary sense, therapeutic application. 
Also in February 2002 the HFEA granted it’s first
two licenses for embryonic SCR on ‘spare’ embryos
from IVF.  The first actual human embryonic stem
cell lines to be derived in the UK resulted from
research on ‘spare’ embryos consensually donated
from PGD in 2003.  It is now thought that such
embryos will be an important future source for
stem cell line derivation.  As the research team stat-
ed, given that PGD embryos do not actually come
from infertile couples they “may be of better quality than
fresh embryos surplus to assisted reproduction cycles”
(Pickering et. al., 2003: 353).  In August 2004 the
HFEA granted its first application for the use of CNR
in embryonic SCR36.
The government response to the Steering
Committee’s report in July 2002 was enthusiastic
with every recommendation endorsed. The
response paper was a confident declaration of the
robustness of UK regulation on SCR illustrative of
the government’s view that the UK was “ideally placed
to be a leading force globally in this field” (2002: 7).  Much
prior discourse received reiteration, for example,
the government’s confirmation that research on
‘early embryos’ must not extend beyond the
Warnock 14 day limit.  In response to the ambiguity
of ‘serious disease’ the government decided that
instead of compiling a guidance list the short term
solution should be for the HFEA to assess this mat-
ter on a case by case basis.  Reflective of the regula-
tory shift at this time a significant proportion of the
response paper pertained to potential future devel-
opments including that under current legislation
any clinical trials of therapeutic applications of SCR
would be regulated by the Medicines Control
Agency (MCA).  However, in April 2003 the MCA and
36 This refers to the project taking place at the Newcastle
Centre for Life, entitled ‘Derivation of Human
Embryonic Stem Cell Lines using Nuclear Transfer and
Parthenogenically Activated Oocytes’. To date (August
2004) the HFEA has approved 10 licenses for embryonic
SCR. Please refer to the very helpful HFEA web-site at
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/Research
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the Medical Devices Agency (MDA) were discontin-
ued and a new agency of the Department of Health,
The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory
Agency (MHRA), came into being.  As indicated in
the Medical Research Council’s Terms and
Conditions37 for research involving human stem
cells ”patient trials of stem cell therapies require a clinical tri-
als certificate from the Medicines and Healthcare products
Regulatory Agency, and approval from a local research ethics
committee”.   The House of Lords itself held a debate
on its own Select Committee’s Report in December
200238.   Although voting to accept the report, objec-
tions were made (by Lord Tombs) about the compo-
sition of the Select Committee, specifically levelling
the complaint that no Lords opposed to the use of
embryos had been chosen as members.  This valid
point indicated the continuity of this criticism
throughout the UK regulatory process that both
committees and advisory groups were already com-
posed in favour of embryo research.  
The UK Stem Cell Bank
The government indicated in mid 2002 that the
Department of Health and the Medical Research
Council had made progress on the establishment of
the UK Stem Cell Bank.  The remainder of this paper
shall focus on the Bank regulations before finally
moving briefly onto the government’s response to
the House of Commons Trade and Industry
Committee’s report on the UK Biotechnology
Industry (2003).  It was agreed by the government
that all HFEA licensed embryonic SCR would be
legally bound to deposit any resultant cell lines in
the Bank ensuring tight regulation and an effective
shared pooling within the research community.
Moreover this would minimise the duplication of
research and so any unnecessary further creation of
embryos for research.  In September 2002 it was
announced that the National Institute for Biological
Standards and Control (NIBSC) had been appointed
to set up the UK Stem Cell Bank.  It would be fund-
ed by both the MRC – 75% – and the Biotechnology
and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) –
25%.  The rationale behind the Bank was to provide
a transparent, well regulated, standardised and
quality-controlled location for embryonic, adult,
fetal and other stem cell lines in the UK.  Other
important considerations were the centralisation of
‘ethically sourced’ lines and, as Pederson has
argued, the contribution ‘Banking’ can play in find-
ing ways to match stem cells with intended recipi-
ents (2003).  Once banked such lines are open to
both academic and commercial researchers, and
also to researchers from overseas.  As part of its gov-
ernance structure the ‘Steering Committee for the
UK Stem Cell Bank and for the Use of Stem Cell
Lines’ was established in December 2002, and now
meets four times a year.  It has a varied membership
including scientists, lay members, ethicists, a the-
ologian and a social scientist.  This makes it
arguably the most diverse governance body to date
in the history of UK SCR regulation.  This forms the
first tier of the Bank’s governance structure which
is completed by a Management Committee and User
Liaison and Clinical Liaison Committees39.  The
Steering Committee is responsible for developing
two codes of practice, one for the Stem Cell Bank,
and one for the use of human stem cell lines.  It is
also responsible for reviewing all applications to
deposit and access stem cell lines from the Bank.
The Management Committee, which is comprised
of scientists is concerned with the implementation
of the codes of practice on the ground, the Bank’s
financial planning and day-to-day quality control
issues. The User Liaison and Clinical Liaison
Committees are both large committees created to
ensure effective communication with the UK SCR
community on issues related to the use of the Bank
and the development of therapies for clinical appli-
cation. 
The ongoing development of both codes of prac-
tice are subject to public consultation.  The consul-
tation for the Stem Cell Bank code of practice was
completed in October 2003 and responses were
taken on board for the completion of the next draft.
This consultation was open, with responses mainly
from the science community, the biotech industry,
royal colleges/societies, with a number of individ-
ual responses and some comments on ethics from
the Nuffield Council40.  Although not published,
both codes were made available in draft form online
37 These Terms and Conditions, which specify how MRC
grantees must work with the UK Stem Cell Bank and
its Codes of Practice, are published online here:
http://www.mrc.ac.uk/pdf-terms_conditions_stem_
cells.pdf
38 This debate may be read here http://www.publica-
tions.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds
02/text/21205-15.htm#21205-15_head0
39 Here I summarise the terms of reference of these four
committees of the UK Stem Cell Bank. For a fuller
account please refer to http://www.mrc.ac.uk/prn/
index/strategy-strategy/strategy-science_strategy/
strategy-strategy_implementation/strategy-govern-
ment_spending_review_initiatives/strategy-stem_
cells/strategy-stem_cell_governance.htm
40 Personal Communication from Professor Andrew
Webster (member of the Stem Cell Bank Steering
Committee). 
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in April 2004.  They remain as such since the con-
sultation for the latter code on the use of human
stem cell lines is ongoing and may lead to changes
in the code of practice for the Stem Cell Bank.  Both
codes include the ethical principles by which the
Bank shall be run.  The Stem Cell Bank code
describes an overarching principle of respect for
“human biological material which it curates”, the physical
separation of Bank staff from the process of secur-
ing donor consent and the responsibility of the
Steering Committee Secretary to maintain the pri-
vacy of donor and recipient identity.  The Secretary
is also to be responsible for putting in place, with
the Bank staff, an anonymised traceability system
for linking donor information to the Banking stem
cell lines so that donors may be identified in cases
where adverse health data is detected (2004: 12).
This is significant since although donors will not
receive any financial reward they will be alerted to
any health problems that their tissue samples may
reveal (for example all donors will be tested for a
range of diseases including HIV).  A more detailed
section on ethical principles is contained within the
draft of the second code – on stem cell lines.  This is
a careful passage which is very specific about the
regulation of donation issues and research ethics
generally.  It is clearly sensitive to public concerns
over the tissue use of the deceased in the light of
Alder Hey, and the forthcoming Human Tissue Bill
2004 aimed partly at addressing these concerns,
currently before parliament.  The code therefore
includes the specific outline of how embryonic stem
cell lines may be used, as decided by the Steering
Committee.  These are “research which has the long term
goal of helping to increase knowledge about serious diseases
and their treatment (as in the 2001 HFEA Regulations), basic
cell research which underpins these aims (as recommended in
the House of Lords Report 2002), and the  development of cell
based therapies for clinical trials in respect of serious human
diseases” (2004: 17).  Although generally throughout
the history of the regulation of SCR in the UK it has
been embryonic sources of stem cells that have been
constructed as being most morally loaded, the code
is novel in its expression of moral and ethical sensi-
tivity to adult and fetal sources.  The code argues
that since such tissues may be obtained following
the termination of a human life their use is indeed
a matter of moral concern.  Consequently in a poli-
cy not that dissimilar to the use of embryonic tissue
the code states that “adult or fetal somatic stem cell lines
curated at the Stem Cell Bank may only be used for research
leading to the development of therapies, or for clinical trials of
human therapies, or for basic research which underpins these
aims” (ibid., p.18).  Adding to the regulatory rigour
the code specifies that Research Ethics Committee
approval must be obtained “as part of the application
procedure for an HFEA research licence, for all research projects
involving embryonic stem cells irrespective of whether the stem
cells have been derived in the UK or elsewhere, for all research
projects involving adult and fetal somatic stem cells, and for
clinical trials of all stem cell derived therapeutic products”
(p.19).  Although there is no explicit mention in the
Human Tissue Bill 2004 of SCR the new government
concern over the treatment of human tissues by the
UK scientific community does indeed flavour the
ethical principles of the Stem Cell Bank Codes.  In
addition, the derivation of stem cell lines from fetal
tissue may be further regulated when the current
process of revising the Polkinghorne guidelines is
complete.  One criticism of the codes of practice as
they currently stand is their framing of ethical
issues largely in terms of donation, consent and
embryo status.  Writing prior to the codes in 2003 a
Hasting Center Report paper drew attention to the
importance of justice issues on the sourcing of stem
cell lines with regard to future tissue matching,
ensuring an equitable degree of societal benefit
from future therapies (Faden et. al., 2003).
Although the use of CNR could solve the tissue
rejection problem it is surprising at this stage that
the stem cell lines code in particular does not
include justice issues related to equitable benefi-
cence.  
A further input into the consultation was provid-
ed by an MRC commissioned study on consumer
views of the Stem Cell Bank.  Reflective of changing
norms of science policy public consultations, both
within government and the science community,
this was an inclusive dialogical exercise that by
employing qualitative methodologies yielded a rich
and detailed response from its participants.  The
exercise took place between the summer of 2002 and
autumn 2003.  It consisted of 12 focus groups and
probed views on SCR and donation.  Although mem-
bers of the public these group were targeted accord-
ing to different perspectives and experiences.  These
comprised two groups of men and two of women
who were blood donors or who carried an organ
donor card or intended to leave their bodies to med-
ical science; one group of men and one of women
‘non-donors’ who were not blood donors, did not
carry an organ donor card or intend to leave their
bodies to medical science; one group of men and
two groups of women who had successfully received
IVF treatment; and one group of men and two
41 This consultation was carried out by People, Science &
Policy which describes itself as ”an independent sci-
ence policy consultancy that specialises in science and
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groups of women undergoing IVF treatment41.  One
striking finding was that women who had under-
gone IVF tended to view their frozen embryos in
kinship terms, as potential children for their exist-
ing children.  The creation of embryos for research
was generally seen negatively, but the derivation of
stem cells from aborted foetuses was seen as more
acceptable and even carrying a potential to provide
some feeling of comfort to those faced with a diffi-
cult decision.  Despite the inherent difficulties of
specified tissue donation in regard to SCR several
group members expressed a desire to be able to out-
line the diseases for which their donation would be
used.  Relatedly there was concern expressed from
both donor and non-donor groups that only
researchers working on ‘serious’ diseases should
have access to the Stem Cell Bank.  Although
already then enshrined in UK law, this was perhaps
sparked by recent research taking place on cosmetic
applications of SCR outside the UK42.  The UK regu-
latory structure is tight here but in a more global
sense it will be important to keep an eye on such
applications not just because they might infringe
on patients’ rights but also because of the occasion-
al overlap between categories of the ‘cosmetic’ and
the ‘medical’.  Arguably an accusation of ‘trivial’
uses of SCR faces a similar burden of explanation to
the legally enshrined notion of ‘serious’ disease.   
Conclusion
Both the Stem Cell Bank and the consultative way
in which its codes of practice are being constructed
add to the rigour and reputation of the UK for its
SCR regulatory structure in Europe and beyond.
This wider regulatory context will continue to
remain important.  In the UK government’s
November 2003 response to the House of Commons
Trade and Industry Committee special report on the
UK Biotechnology Industry43 concern was expressed
over the future possibility of European regulations
stalling UK competitiveness in this sector.  The
response states in reference to SCR that “The
Government shares the view of the Committee that this advan-
tage must not be undermined by developments at the European
level. To tighten and add further hurdles to the regulatory sys-
tem could be seen as a failing of a system which has undergone
rigorous scrutiny in the UK” (2003: 4).  Clearly the UK
government espouses a subsidiarity viewpoint in
order to protect its own regulatory structure which
it regards as setting the foundation for present and
future UK competitiveness.  In a blow to hopes of
European harmonisation the response goes on to
say that “The Government has maintained throughout nego-
tiations in Europe that the detail and application of ethical
principles which reflect the religious and cultural diversity in
Europe, are a matter for Member State legislation and not
within EU competence” (op. cit).  Although religious
opposition to embryo research in the UK has been
present it has not been as strong as in other EU
states reflective, relatively, of both the UK’s secu-
larism and weaker Catholic church.  This allied
with the head-start over regulating embryo
research due to IVF and the custodianship of the UK
regulatory process by the science establishment
are, it may be suggested, the most overriding expla-
nations for the comparative permissiveness of the
UK SCR environment.  
At the outset of this paper it was asked whether
any lessons could be learned from the UK regulato-
ry experience to date for other EU states.  Perhaps
the most commendable feature of the UK process is
that it has exhibited signs of improvement as it has
proceeded.  For example this is seen especially in
the gradual improvement of its public engagement
and the increasingly diverse representation on reg-
ulatory committees.  The codes of practice of the
Stem Cell Bank also indicate both a preparedness
for, and in their flexibility a responsiveness to,
future developments.   It ought to be cautioned that
the regulatory process in a given country is in very
significant ways tied to the specificities of cultural,
economic and religious context, thus the notion
that one country may have lessons for another
requires qualification.  Indeed a case can be made
for lessons being drawn from other EU countries for
the reach of public engagement on cloning and
SCR.  Undoubtedly a mutual exchange of lessons
can be learnt from both respective strengths and
weaknesses of different countries.  Although there
may not be harmonisation on the regulation of
research, harmonisation on the best practice for
achieving a democratic regulatory process may be a
more realistic goal.  The clearest regulatory weak-
ness of the UK process centres around the accusa-
tion of self-policing in that the composition of past
committees has been heavily skewed in favour of
scientists who are likely to already favour SCR.
society issues”. Please refer to http://www.people-
scienceandpolicy.com/national_stem_cell_Bank.html
42 Although not unambiguously ‘cosmetic’, for a recent
report see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/
3473889.stm
43 The report is available online here http://www.publi-
cations.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmtrd
ind/87/87.pdf with the government response here
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm20020
3/cmselect/cmtrdind/1282/1282.pdf
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Whilst the recent regulation of the Stem Cell Bank
shows signs of introducing a more interdisciplinary
representation this is something that requires more
work both in the UK and internationally.  For exam-
ple to improve the social science and ethical repre-
sentation on both advisory committees and as advi-
sors to the governmental committees would be in
line with the recent interdisciplinary funding of
SCR which extended across the UK research councils.  
Ultimately any process of regulation in this area
should be judged by its ability to see the issue from
a multiplicity of different, often critical, perspec-
tives.  This can only serve to bolster the robustness
and rigour of regulation.  The UK has the longest
standing tradition of constructing measures for the
regulation of stem cell and embryonic research.
Instead of falling for the temptation of self-congrat-
ulation the UK regulatory process will be best served
by a continuation of  healthy self-reflexive critique
aimed at further refining both interdisciplinary
inspection and public inclusiveness. 
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